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Abstract 
 
This paper intends to shed some light on strategies and power resources of subsidiary 
managers and employee representatives involved in ‘charter changes’ and the 
implementation of ‘best practices’ developed elsewhere. Research shows that local 
managers face a dilemma in that they need both internal legitimacy (within the MNC 
itself) and external legitimacy (within the local context). We argue that the power 
resources key actors draw on in the (internal) decision-making processes of  ‘charter 
changes’ are intertwined with certain (external) national business system (NBS) 
characteristics, an aspect often neglected in North-American research about MNCs. 
We identify three key influences, which restrain or empower local management and 
employees in their ability to make strategic choices and gain power within the MNC. 
They are (1) the overall strategic approach of the multinational group, (2) the strategic 
position and the economic performance of the subsidiary itself and (3) the degree of 
institutional embeddedness of the subsidiary in the host country. Comparative mini-
case studies are used to illustrate the effect of local management and employee 
representatives’ empowerment on their ability to retain skills and work practices 
supportive of a diversified quality production process in the face of MNC pressure to 
adopt global ‘best practices’ based on more standardised production processes.  
Key words: socio-political issues of subsidiary management, strategic choice, social 
embeddedness, national business systems, charter change, best practices
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we want to shed some light on how local managers and employee 
representatives in subsidiaries deal with the coercive institutional pressures from 
MNCs for more global consistency and standardization and how the degree of 
company social embeddedness in a particular national business system influences 
local strategies and politics of resistance. The national business systems (NBS) 
approach argues that within the same business system we will tend to see similar 
strategic and political practices. However, it is also important to understand how local 
managers influence and interpret the rules of the game and develop local sources of 
power enhancement within the multinational corporation (MNC) itself. The question 
of whether and how MNCs are moving towards greater global integration is 
dependent on the strategic approach and politics of both headquarters (HQ) and 
subsidiary management.  
 
This paper develops a socio-political framework integrating the opposing arguments 
of discourses about the ‘global enterprise’, a topic of mainstream international 
management literature, and ‘divergent capitalisms’, a debate predominantly led by 
European scholars. However, both discourses see economic organisations as mainly 
structurally determined, despite their different focus on either global or national 
influences, and both give little consideration to the influence of key local managers 
and employee representatives. We emphasise, in contrast, the power, politics and 
strategic choices of local management and argue that these are also influenced by the 
social context of company-specific institutions and the degree of societal 
embeddedness of the company and its actors.  
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Firstly, we briefly review the main arguments in the globalisation and national 
business systems approaches about global and national business practices in MNCs 
(section two). We will then assess the present debate on societal practices in MNCs 
from the perspective of the national business system approach (section 3) and then 
focus the discussion on the role of key local actors (managers and employees) within 
MNCs (section 4). This provides the analytical framework for the discussion of three 
key influences found in our comparative case study based project, which point to 
three major power resources for local management to resist and contest the pressure to 
globalise local practices within MNCs (section 5). 
 
2. Globalization, ‘best practices’ and the ‘global enterprise’ 
 
The globalisation approach strongly resembles earlier debates on the impact of 
industrialisation on organisational convergence (Pugh and Hickson, 1997). Whereas 
the early ‘convergence’ argument was more related to structural aspects such as 
technological and economic change, more recent approaches stress that globalisation 
is also driven by a convergence of business culture and policies.  
 
It has been claimed that MNCs are becoming 'placeless' as national identity is 
replaced in global corporations by the commitment to a single unified global mission 
(e.g. Ohmae, 1990). Similarly, research in strategic management (e.g. Whittington 
and Mayer 2002) stresses that the organisational structures of global firms will 
inevitably follow the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism with a multidivisional 
organisational structure and the main focus on shareholder value. Continental 
European models of the capitalist firm, although occasionally successful in the past, 
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have now 'lost out' to the Anglo-Saxon business model (ibid). Moreover, MNCs 
increasingly use shareholder-value as a key measure of corporate performance in their 
business units and, it is argued, the more global company operations become, the 
more likely companies are to use similar tools, such as downsizing, to achieve 
performance goals based on shareholder value (see e.g. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 1998; Hunt, 
2000; Bakan, 2004).  
 
In line with these arguments, Mueller (1994) stresses that it is not only business 
structures and strategies which work against the effects of national business systems 
but also organisational processes and practices. These so called ‘organisational 
effects’ are understood as global change management patterns emerging through 
learning across borders and the internationalisation of ‘best practices’. Examples for 
organisational effects are the diffusion of ‘best practices’ through benchmarking, 
global manufacturing strategies and the diffusion of technologies and knowledge.  
 
The globalisation debate has of course influenced the debate about HRM as an 
organizational strategy. The earlier focus on the Japanization of production and its 
implications for the management of employee resources, which was particularly 
marked in the UK due to the influx of Japanese manufacturing companies in the 
1980s and 1990s, has given way to the promotion of Anglo-Saxon, chiefly US, 
approaches to HRM to support international competitiveness in the wake of Japan’s 
financial crises. Earlier studies of Japanization were overoptimistic about the extent to 
which Japanese practices were transferable to different national contexts (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1997) and were followed by studies emphasising the limits to transfer and 
the considerable modifications that had to be made to adapt such country-specific 
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HRM systems (Elger and Smith, 1995; Palmer, 1996; Sharpe, 2001). The current 
dominance of US HRM perspectives forms part of a longstanding debate, which 
focuses on market-led convergence and the direct transfer of US HRM practices by 
US MNCs together with their emulation by other companies keen to become market-
leaders in their own right (Lane, 2003; Lucio et al, 2001; Mayrhofer and Brewster, 
2003). The question of what US-style HRM actually is in practice, however, often 
remains unanswered, (Mayrhofer and Brewster, 2003).  
 
Leading scholars predict not only the emergence of homogenous structures and HRM 
practices, but also of a global corporate culture, replacing national home and host 
country identities. The development of ‘global mindsets’ (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2002) and ‘transnational management mentalities’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) are 
understood as crucial management tasks in the making of the ‘global firm’.  
 
The globalisation discourse can thus be summarised as follows: MNCs are becoming 
increasingly stateless enterprises. Corporate structures and strategies are following 
Anglo-Saxon business patterns, as they increasingly ascribe a higher role to corporate 
finance and shareholder value. Divergent interests and local power resources of key 
subsidiary managers and employee representative bodies are played down or are 
ignored altogether by this discourse.  
 
3. National business systems and enduring societal practices in MNCs 
 
European institutionalist research raises some real doubts about whether global 
economic, cultural and institutional forces will actually lead to greater convergence of 
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local practices. Researchers in this tradition have provided evidence over the last 20 
years or so that economic organisations are not just shaped by one type of capitalism, 
the Anglo-Saxon model. In comparative cross-national studies, national business 
systems (Whitley, 1997), national specific ‘industrial orders’ (Lane, 1989) and 
‘societal effects’ (Sorge, 1996) are seen as creating alternative paths of organising 
businesses and management. The key thesis of these approaches is that historically 
grown national institutions such as the financial, educational and industrial relations 
systems of a country are interdependently linked with the characteristics of business 
organizations in that country and exert an influence on, for example, their strategy, 
structure, technologies and employment relations. A key finding is that the degree of 
‘embeddedness’ i.e. interdependence, cohesion and integration of institutions and 
business organisations in the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism is much lower than in 
other capitalist countries such as Germany and Japan. Thus, the implementation of 
global best practices and the ability to change local practices in subsidiaries situated 
in highly integrated national business systems will be more restricted and less radical 
than in less integrated systems because, for example, the specific national system of 
industrial relations often gives local managers more possibilities to influence 
decision-making processes within the MNC.  
 
Whitley (1999), working from a sociological perspective, has demonstrated the close 
interconnections between the national business system, institutional characteristics 
and the firms’ governance systems, capabilities and workplace systems. Whilst Hall 
and Soskice (2001), using an economics approach, come to similar conclusions about 
the interconnected nature of macro and micro level characteristics in different 
business systems. Both pieces of research point to the major differences between 
 7
collaborative business systems, or in Hall and Soskice’s terminology, coordinated 
market economies, such as the German system, and the compartmentalized or liberal 
market economies, such as the UK. Whilst the former promote common technical 
communities in specific industry sectors with considerable levels of employee 
autonomy and involvement in problem diagnosis and solution as the key to 
organisational success (Whitley, 1999, p.91; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.10-11, 58), the 
latter rely on market relationships, so-called arms length relationships, with extensive 
unilateral control by management (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.29-30). 
 
Institutionalist scholars highlight the fact that there are still strong national effects on 
local practices in globally operating companies. On the one hand, the MNC's country-
of-origin influences practices within MNCs ( Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003), such 
as strategy, structure and HRM practices (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998) as well as 
modes of control (Harzing and Sorge, 2003). On the other hand, host country effects 
influence the application of MNC policies and practices on the ground. Thus studies 
show that, even when MNCs do apply best practices globally, such as the team-
working concept, local adaptation of these practices is still necessary. An example of 
this is found in recent research comparing team working in German, French and 
British subsidiaries of MNCs in the automobile sector, which draws attention to the 
enduring role of the national business system patterns of the host country (Woywode, 
2002). Differences in the systems of education and industrial relations, for example, 
led to a ‘higher qualification of German employees compared with their French 
counterparts’ which allowed for a ‘higher degree of polyvalence, more frequent job 
rotation and a higher degree of group autonomy in German car manufacturing plants’ 
(ibid. p.515). Earlier studies carried out in the UK, Spain and Germany also showed 
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significant differences in the way team-working was implemented due to very 
different NBS characteristics including the systems of education and training as well 
as very different industrial relations characteristics (see Carr, 1994; Murakami, 1995; 
Ortiz, 1998; Streeck, 1996). These findings are replicated by research in other 
industry sectors such as banking, where the polyvalence of German employees has led 
to greater levels of autonomy then, for example, in France, despite both countries 
implementing the lean banking concept (Haipeter, 2002). 
 
To summarize, compared to the globalisation discourse, which stresses the diffusion 
of global best practices worldwide and, with it, a top-down process of convergence of 
strategies, structures and culture, European institutionalism emphasises the continuing 
impact of different national business practices on MNCs. One reason for this is ‘the 
relative weakness of international institutions’ (Whitley, 2003, p. 31) compared to the 
institutional framework of the nation state, which makes it very unlikely that national 
business practices will lose their influence on most of the internationally operating 
companies.  
 
4. The socio-political underpinnings of local practices: Who pulls, how and why? 
 
The discourses about the importance of global practice and the enduring impact of 
national business practices in MNCs, however, tell us very little about how local 
managers and employee representatives develop, negotiate and even resist the 
implementation of global best practices. There is a tendency in both approaches to 
neglect local managers and employees, their interests and the dynamics of conflict 
and change at the local level of company (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003).  
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Westney’s (1993) concept of ‘conflicting isomorphic pulls’ in MNCs can be used to 
show  that both arguments focus primarily on external ‘isomorphic pulls’ on local 
practices in MNCs. Whilst the globalisation approach is mostly interested in showing 
that MNCs transfer global practices across borders due to the forces of an increasingly 
globalized business environment (referred to as 'global pull'), NBS research shows 
that pulls from the diverse national institutional contexts still influence practices in 
MNCs in the form of home country/host country effects (referred to as 'national pull'). 
However, there are also ‘pulls’ coming from the managers and other key groups 
within the multinational organisation itself. Kostova and Zaheer (1999) point out that 
MNCs always require legitimacy in ‘both institutional environments’: the external 
(home and host country) and the internal (MNC) environments.  
 
Westney’s research raises the issues of the complexity of decision-making and 
legitimacy in MNCs but fails to address the active role of the MNC managers as 
decision-makers, especially at the local level, a fact criticised by Kristensen and 
Zeitlin (2005). North-American institutionalist scholars of the MNC have an 
increasingly shared definition of what is the most desirable model for a modern 
multinational, namely the development of more ‘global, international, transnational 
companies’ (see  Westney, 1993, p. 64). This follows the global organisational effect 
approach and ignores the ‘conflicting pulls’ in MNCs. 
 
We would contend, however, that the implementation (or non-implementation) of the 
global policies of the MNC is a controversial and deeply political process (Ferner, 
2000), reflecting often conflicting contextual rationalities (Geppert et al., 2003a) and 
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leading to tension (Ferner and Qunintanilla, 1998). We would like to take Westney’s 
concept further and ask: 
 Who does the 'pulling'? (i.e. role of key local managers and employees)  
 How they 'pull'? (i.e. their local strategies and politics)   
 Why they 'pull' ? (i.e. their own locally based interests). 
 
These questions raise the central issue of power and politics in MNCs - a field of 
research ‘often downplayed’ (Ferner, 2000) in the academic discourse on international 
management  and the emerging global enterprise. We would argue that strategies, 
politics and power resources of local management are becoming an increasingly 
important issue as MNCs develop more global strategies and best practices (Mueller, 
1994), which include 'transnational network'-like structures and relationships (Nohria 
and Ghoshal, 1997) and 'global mindsets' (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2002). Even 
where MNCs have applied more traditional bureaucratic control practices, these have 
not worked automatically, but have been underpinned by often informal political 
processes (Ferner, 2000). Power relations and political control over uncertainties and 
scarce resources have always been crucially important factors in the operation of 
MNCs (Doz and Pralahad, 1993) but this is even more the case in the structurally 
disintegrated, multi-focused and network based relationships currently being 
developed in MNCs.  
 
In our view then, the degree of global integration is not only a question of 
environmental fit with impersonal economic, technological cultural and institutional 
environmental pressures, but also a matter of power resources and the politics of 
managers and other key groups within the local subsidiaries. They are able to 
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influence the rules of the games in the MNC’s move towards greater convergence and 
integration. However, the questions about how and why these groups decide to 
influence the manner in which global practices are implemented will vary 
significantly between subsidiaries. Therefore, the key interest of this paper is to 
develop a better understanding of the socio-political underpinnings of local practices. 
We especially want to address the question of how the degree of interdependence and 
social embeddedness of the host country subsidiary in a particular national business 
system (NBS) helps to support the political strategies of local managers and employee 
representatives to resist or shape the implementation of global practices. National 
business systems, we argue, provide local managers with different power resources, 
which support some strategies and politics while at the same time discouraging others. 
Employee representative bodies, often in coalition with management, also play a key 
role in this process and we give some examples of this in our comparative discussion 
of the empirical findings.  
 
Besides the degree of national institutional embeddedness or integration of 
subsidiaries, there are two other important factors to consider in determining 
important sources of subsidiary power: the strategic decision-making approach of the 
MNC as a whole and the strategic importance of the local subsidiary for the MNC and 
its performance (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Recent studies of the management of 
multinational subsidiaries show how host country subsidiaries can operate as 
relatively autonomous units influenced by their local business environment and thus 
can constitute sources of local variation in the globalisation process (Belanger et al., 
1999). They are often able to develop a more active role within the management 
process of MNCs than is normally assumed. This is the focus of studies analysing  
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‘multinational subsidiary evolution’ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), ‘subsidiary 
initiatives’ (Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998) and ‘entrepreneurship in the global firm’ 
(Birkinshaw, 2000), which all focus on the idea of subsidiary choice and the change 
or maintenance of subsidiary ‘charters’ ‘in terms of markets served, products 
manufactured, technologies held, functional areas covered or any combination 
thereof’ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998: 782). This research stream emphasises 
primarily the optimal fit of subsidiary structures and processes with the local task 
environment, but also takes into account social and communication issues, such as the 
structuring of negotiations over charter responsibilities. Thus, the enhancement of 
existing charters takes place primarily via company specific power relations and 
internal competition between local subsidiaries. However, there is less consideration 
of the interdependence between the opportunities to make strategic choices to enhance 
charter profiles and particular national institutional contexts. As we will see later, the 
loss or enhancement of charters is not just a question of more or less successful 
competition between subsidiaries nor is it solely driven by the HQ (Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998). Local institutions also influence the politics of charter competition and 
the issue of whether a subsidiary is able to retain or enhance its mandates. Our Anglo-
German comparison reveals that nationally specific forms of production, authority 
sharing and employment relations provide managers with more or less power 
resources enabling them to actively shaping ‘charter changes’ or not within MNCs.  
 
To sum up, the power resources and political strategies of local managers and 
employee representatives to influence the local implementation of global practices are 
constrained by company specific institutional settings such as the overall strategic 
decision-making approach of the MNC, subsidiary performance and the strategic 
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importance of the subsidiary for the MNC, as well as by the degree of institutional 
embeddedness of the subsidiary in a particular NBS. Those factors differ significantly 
between Germany and the UK, as we will see in the next section.  
 
5. Socio-political processes of implementing global strategies at the local level: 
Three mini case studies 
 
In the following section we will discuss three case studies, which illustrate how and 
why local managers and employee representative bodies are able to influence the 
‘globalisation’ of established local practice. We draw on material from an Anglo-
German research project about change management in three of the four key players in 
the lifts & escalators sector, an American, a Finnish, and a German MNC. Table 1 
provides an overview of the three companies and their basic characteristics. All three 
MNCs have subsidiaries in Britain and Germany which allowed for paired 
comparisons (Sorge and Warner, 1986, pp. 37-46) on the subsidiary level. Our 
research is based on 30 expert interviews at subsidiary and HQ level, as well as 
corporate documents and material in the public domain about the companies and the 
industry (for further details of research methods used see Geppert et al., 2003a). We 
have published papers about various aspects of this research elsewhere (Geppert et al., 
2002, 2003a,b) and want to confine ourselves here to the questions raised earlier in 
this paper: how does the overall strategy of the MNC as well as the institutional 
environment of the NBS at subsidiary level influence the power and politics of local 
managers to enhance or deplete their charter responsibilities? 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Methodologically, we see local practices as the basis of our analysis, because we 
believe that the process of globalisation cannot be fully grasped by restricting analysis 
to the macro-level of society or MNC headquarters, which will often lead researchers 
to stress convergence. Therefore, we take the local as a starting point for any 
consideration about the global (Maurice, 2000). Such an approach allows us to study 
both how globalisation can lead to an increasing similarity of social practices and 
where there is continuing scope for local practices and their socio-political nature. 
The key question we consider is whether local management and employee 
representatives have the power resources and strategic choice to influence, resist and 
negotiate the process of globalisation. According to Child, strategic choice can be 
defined as a decision-making ‘process whereby power-holders within organisations 
[in this study the subsidiary] decide upon the course of action' (Child, 1972, 1997). 
However, in order to avoid the conceptual problem of voluntaristic ‘reductionism’ 
(Clark, 2003; Whittington, 1988) where managers can wishfully shape the world as 
they like it (Child, 1997), we isolate company specific and national institution induced 
constraints, which can be both supportive or unsupportive for local management and 
employees in their bid to influence ‘global isomorphic pulls’. These institutional 
constraints are not understood as objective and determining, but as ‘enacted 
environments’ (Weick, 1979), which constrain and enable certain political strategies 
of local actors. Thus, from a process perspective, the ‘impacts’ on subsidiary choice 
and politics, discussed in the cases below, should not be understood as ‘ isomorphic 
pulls’ determining local practices, but as constraints introduced via cognitive, social 
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and political processes within a nexus of power relations (Clark, 2003; Geppert and 
Clark, 2003). 
 
Key influences on local management and employee representatives’ ability to 
shape the implementation of MNC global strategies 
 
Case 1: The influence of MNC strategies on local management’s ability to shape 
the implementation of MNC global strategies 
 
Case 1a: The Finnish MNC: a centralised, imposed global strategy 
A centralised, imposed strategic decision-making approach as applied, for example, in 
the Finnish MNC significantly challenged the power and restricted the strategic 
choices of local management. The imposition of its standardisation strategy on the 
German subsidiary, the last subsidiary to be integrated into the company model, put 
enormous pressure on the earlier high level of autonomy enjoyed by the subsidiary, 
which, as a formerly independent company, had been bought by the MNC as a 
business learning organisation. Its area of expertise was in the customised escalator 
manufacturing business, an expertise local management now saw as being 
undermined by the MNC’s globalisation strategy. The struggle of local management 
in Germany to maintain control of the subsidiary has been intense and is still ongoing. 
The implementation of the company model is part of Finnish HQ attempts to 
rationalise operations and the subsequent reorganisation is seen as a threat to both 
skills and jobs by German staff. The mistrust generated has led to communication 
problems between the Finnish managers on the one hand and the German managers 
and workforce on the other, as well as to various forms of resistance to the company 
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model from all levels of local management and the works council and employees. 
Examples include resistance from German engineers in research and development to 
the new finance and accounting driven culture in Finnish companies, which makes it 
easier for (HQ) management to turn down engineers’ ideas for investments and 
concentrate on the priorities of international investors (see also Moen and Lilja, 
2001). There has also been resistance from subsidiary management, which was 
gradually replaced by Finnish managers sent from the HQ and resistance from the 
works council to any changes to the wages system or methods of work organisation as 
part of the implementation of the new company model. Details of this conflict are 
covered in case 3. 
 
A recent study has highlighted the significance of whether a subsidiary deals with the 
local or global market for its autonomy in HRM (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003). The 
decision by a MNC to use a subsidiary to serve the global market on its behalf 
provides a powerful incentive for the MNC to centralise control (ibid). The Finnish 
case provides an illustration of just such a process. The global mandate being given to 
the German subsidiary was based on a standardised system of production for the 
global market. This was seen as an attack on the subsidiary’s technical and 
engineering expertise shared by all the employees, who had previously been used to 
supply engineering solutions to plants throughout the MNC. The attempt to impose a 
standardised global model led to severe conflicts and a power struggle between local 
management and works council and the MNC HQ. The emergence of a ‘battlefield’ 
(Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2001) centred on the power distribution between the HQ and 
the subsidiary and the contestation of local power resources of engineering expertise 
and workforce skills, which the new MNC strategy was now calling into question. In 
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its new global market approach, the HQ is not so much interested in sharing 
knowledge or mutual learning with local managers, as in the tight financial control of 
subsidiary operations. Thus an imposed centralised strategic approach or ‘non-
negotiated attempts at imposition of systems’ increases the likelihood of the 
emergence of ‘battlefields’ if it undermines existing levels of subsidiary autonomy 
and can lead to rather instable, tenuous and conflicting HQ-subsidiary relations 
(Ferner, 2000)., which undermine the overall performance of the MNC as a whole.  
 
Even in this case, there were still sources of subsidiary power, which local 
management and works council could bring into play. These are investigated later in 
case 2a. 
 
 
Case 1b: The German MNC: a negotiated, decentralised strategy 
The German MNC investigated was operating in its home business system and 
illustrates the characteristics of German manufacturing based on diversified quality 
production. Its subsidiaries across the world have a local not a global focus and are 
therefore less subject to centralised control, as this would impair their ability to 
respond to local market pressures (Fenton’O’Creevy et al., 2003, p.9). For the 
purposes of this paper it sheds some light on the question of why and in which 
circumstances the power resources of local managers and employee representatives 
are strong. This goes beyond the issue of institutional embeddedness and shows that 
negotiated and decentralised strategic approaches are crucial where companies are 
aiming for the upper market segment and more customisation. In such cases the 
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knowledge of local subsidiaries is highly relevant and the possibilities of global 
standardisation and central control are limited. 
 
The German MNC has recently embarked on a cautious internationalisation process 
but still follows a ‘local responsiveness’ strategy of local differentiation among its 
foreign subsidiaries. The company has major manufacturing locations worldwide and 
focuses on DQP technology in its German subsidiaries, whilst the more standard 
components manufacturing is subject to constant pressure from potential Eastern 
European locations (Girndt and Meiners, 2002). HQ management representatives in 
Germany emphasized the relative autonomy of subsidiaries worldwide to run their 
own operations:  
 
‘Fundamentally, we have always followed a very decentralized philosophy and 
believe that our subsidiaries are in a better position to know their own markets and 
how best to sell their products on the market and their services; that they can do that 
most successfully. There are only a few specific areas like the uniform reporting 
system, some R&D, which we need to centralize; in everything else our subsidiaries 
are relatively free if they perform well. If they don’t, then we have to step in but 
basically they should have the freedom to develop their business in a sensible way.’ 
 
This perspective is supported by our data from the German manufacturing subsidiary. 
Innovations have been introduced including the recent introduction of lean production 
into the lift-manufacturing site, which involved the abolition of traditional 
organisational hierarchies on the shop floor and their replacement with group 
working. It was, however, successfully achieved via negotiation with the stakeholders 
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in the local organisation. Although the changes have led to some reduction in the 
autonomy of the shop floor, the continuing high level of decentralization in the 
German MNC can well be understood as a general feature of the home country. A 
recent study by Lane (2000), for example, shows that German MNCs allocate more 
resources and competencies as well as organizational and financial autonomy to their 
subsidiaries to develop networks in host countries similar to those existing in German 
industry. In addition, studies have highlighted the fact that German MNCs are the 
least effective MNCs in terms of their direction over the policy of their acquisitions 
and the level of integration of their subsidiaries (Child et al., 2001). This partly 
reflects their lower level of experience in managing international subsidiaries and also 
their wish to preserve and learn from the competences of their subsidiaries.  
 
The negotiated, decentralised approach was also reflected in the German MNC’s 
dealings with its British subsidiary, which, however, resulted in the closure of the 
large-scale manufacturing operations in the UK and the shift to decentralised service 
centres. These were seen by the British management of the subsidiary as the best way 
forward in view of their relatively poor performance levels. This transition is 
discussed in more detail in case 3.  
 
This case illustrates that, compared to the imposed and centralised approach, where 
inter-organisational learning and knowledge sharing across borders appears to be 
problematic, a negotiated and decentralised strategy not only supports the 
development of strong local power resources at the local level of the subsidiary, but is 
also important for companies, which want to enhance learning across borders because 
it is based on a more pluralistic organisational culture, where divergence is seen as 
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driver for more explorative learning processes (Geppert and Clark, 2003). This 
contrasts with the rather universalistic model of the ‘global enterprise’, where the 
dominance of exploitative learning approaches can cause severe conflicts and lead to 
power battles that hinder knowledge sharing (ibid). 
 
Case 2: The influence of the subsidiary’s strategic position and its performance 
within the MNC on local management and employee representatives’ ability to 
shape the implementation of MNC global strategies 
 
Case 2a: The strategic position of the subsidiary 
The strategic position of the subsidiaries within the MNC can give them some power 
to protect local expertise and work to successfully resist the imposition of 
standardised practices, as the case illustrations of the Finnish MNC show. Here, in the 
conflict between local managers in Germany and the HQ, the German subsidiary has 
been drawing on its strategic position within the MNC itself to promote a different 
rationality to that of the parent company. The aim of the German subsidiary is to 
legitimate the continuation of its own actions as a customised escalator manufacturer; 
if this is successful, however, it could seek to influence the broader strategic direction 
of the company as a whole in its role as the leading R & D centre. The parent 
company has enforced its direct personal authority on the subsidiary via the 
importation of Finnish managers from the HQ to enforce the company policy. 
However, they still face a long battle to impose the social norms to support the 
Finnish MNC’s formal control mechanisms in a business system hostile to its goals of 
global mass production. As mentioned in section 3, a key component of the German 
system of national comparative advantage has been the close cooperative 
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collaboration in the workplace based on the extensive autonomy of a highly skilled 
workforce  (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.24). Management has relied on the skilled 
workforce for firm growth, task performance and problem solving; in practice there 
has been limited separation between management and the workforce (Whitley, 1999, 
p.108-9). All these characteristics of the traditional German manufacturing model 
were evident in the German subsidiary. The Finnish MNC also has to tread carefully 
due to the strategic importance of the German subsidiary’s R&D and technical 
competences for the MNC as a whole. The manager leading the task force responsible 
for the implementation of the company model worldwide referred to the HQ ‘s high 
emphasis on financial control in strategic management decisions but sees the need for 
the Finnish HQ: ‘to take the foot off the pedal a little bit in that area and try to be 
more supportive rather than supervisory in that respect’. Otherwise, there is a real 
risk of the Finnish MNC losing the host country advantages of its German subsidiary, 
which were the reasons for its acquisition in the first place. An example of this is the 
removal of certain German engineers from the R & D area because they were seen as 
‘too German’ in their orientation. The engineers were still insisting on using their 
expertise to develop customised, highly engineered solutions for specific customers 
and resisted changes to the product structure and manufacturing processes entailed in 
the promotion of the new company model. In other words, the Finnish managers saw 
the engineer’s national interests as blocking the HQ’s aim of global rather than local 
market development.  
 
However, the strategic position of the subsidiary within the MNC based on its 
research and development and technical expertise provided local management with 
some power resources to thus far maintain their original charter responsibilities 
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despite the shift in the overall strategic approach of the MNC towards the 
globalisation of local practices.  
 
Case 2b: Subsidiary performance 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) have shown that performance related ‘track records’ are 
also important power resources. Ferner (2000) also argues that ‘poor performance’ 
will significantly weaken the political influence of the local management. This was 
illustrated in two of the British subsidiaries and can be quite clearly related back to 
the UK host country institutions, which are not supportive of manufacturing 
companies. Hollingsworth (p. 145-146, 1997), in his study of the US system, has 
argued that liberal market economies, where firms are not embedded in a rich 
institutional environment, do not have the capacities to support flexible systems of 
production nor high quality production in traditional industries. Similarly, both 
Whitley and Hall and Soskice argue that the reliance on classical market contracting 
in countries like the UK and US, together with the relatively impoverished 
institutional environment, inhibits cooperative, collaborative action of firms, which 
could support complex manufacturing and construction (Whitley, 1999, p.3 & p.23; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.25). We investigate this issue further in case 3. 
 
Interviews with local management in the British subsidiaries showed that they did not 
have the power resources to argue the case for the retention of manufacturing units in 
the UK (nor did they appear to wish to) since the performance of the UK subsidiaries 
of the American and German MNCs was poor compared to other units in the MNC. 
This was in contrast to the German subsidiaries, where local management was able to 
negotiate restructuring and outsourcing policies to maintain high-level manufacturing 
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and engineering competences in Germany. The decision to close all manufacturing 
units in the UK was understood by local British managers as the only possible 
strategy to meet increasing HQ demands to improve economic performance. In the 
American MNC, this process included the laying off of all manufacturing staff, the 
closure of manufacturing sites and the establishment of a centralized customer care 
centre at a different location, where the company hired new, less qualified and 
cheaper staff. As a result, the number of staff was about 50% of what it was before the 
reorganization. The British subsidiary of the German MNC opted for a model with 
decentralized regional service centres and tried to retain the former staff, although the 
layoff of 10% of the workforce was seen as inevitable. In both cases, local 
management in the UK stressed in our interviews that their reorganization measures 
were the only rational answers to cheaper, more efficient manufacturing locations in 
Eastern Europe or Asia within their respective multinational groups. They focused 
their attention, therefore, on influencing the structure and operation of the customer 
care centres, which were viewed as the future for the British subsidiaries. 
 
This approach is in line with the overall trend in manufacturing in Britain to close 
down manufacturing facilities and concentrate on the financially more lucrative 
service functions: ‘Manufacturing accounts for less than 19 per cent of the economy 
and the figure is getting smaller. The tail doesn’t wag the dog…’ (Financial Times, 
2001). Compared to their British counterparts, the German subsidiaries were not only 
‘better performers’, but also in a much stronger strategic position to negotiate wide 
charter responsibilities. The poorly performing British subsidiaries were only in a 
position to reduce the amount of charter divestments by concentrating in the future on 
service and maintenance functions only. 
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Case 3: The influence of the degree of institutional embeddedness of the subsidiary 
in the host country environment on the ability of local management to ability to 
shape the implementation of MNC global strategies 
 
Case 3a: Subsidiary operating in a highly integrated NBS 
The German business system is a highly integrated system and is described by Wever 
(1995) as adopting a ‘negotiated approach’ in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon unilateral 
approach. It shows a marked departure from the neo-classical free market model and 
operates on the basis of institutional and organizational linkages, which promote the 
negotiation of adjustment issues between the major stakeholders, including the 
employees (ibid. pp.11-14). A key characteristic of the German NBS is that major 
institutions are more interdependent than in the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003; Whitley, 1999) and 
institutional features are collaborative (Whitley, 1999). Hall and Soskice’s study, for 
example, demonstrates the inter-linkages between national institutional infrastructure, 
corporate strategy and firm behaviour as a result of institutional complementarities i.e. 
a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy develops 
complementary practices in other spheres (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.14). Thus, in the 
German system, the principle of ‘strategic interaction’ is reflected both at macro and 
micro levels with ‘dense networks linking the managers and technical personnel 
inside a company to their counterparts in other firms’ (ibid, p.23) and an internal 
structure of the firm based on collaborative and cooperative modes of action (ibid, 
p.24). Similarly, Whitley (1999) points to the close connections between firms’ 
competitive strategies, internal structures and external relationships. He argues that 
institutions, which encourage adversarial relations between competitors, as in the UK 
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market based system, encourage similar connections between, for example, elements 
of the production chain and between employer and employees (ibid, p.33) and vice 
versa in institutions, which encourage collaboration. Our study revealed within the 
German subsidiaries, a high level of functional integration between R&D, sales and 
service and manufacturing with a cross fertilization of ideas between the three areas, 
compared to the British subsidiaries, where freestanding manufacturing functions 
could easily be closed down. Whitley points out that market types of ownership as in 
the UK encourage strong ownership boundaries and the absence of any overlapping 
between units (1999, p.36), firms are run as a portfolio of separate units, bought and 
sold as financial performance dictates (ibid, p.106). The high level of integration in 
Germany, however, gave the American MNC’s German management confidence that 
their role will continue to be important for the MNC. Its HR Director argued that 
purely manufacturing plants can be moved quite easily but not manufacturing plants 
tightly linked to engineering and R&D centres.  
 
The case of the Finnish MNC illustrates some of the problems faced by MNCs when 
they seek to globalise local practices in subsidiaries, which are in a highly integrated 
NBS. This is particularly the case where local management has gained extra power 
resources through good subsidiary performance and an important strategic position 
within the multinational group. The MNC was confronted with a works community 
built upon on high level engineering skills, both in the German subsidiary and, to a 
lesser extent, in their British subsidiary, which as part of the acquired German 
company, reflected German engineering traditions, even using the German 
terminology, but was not involved in R & D activity. The existence of technically 
based works communities is seen as an integral part of the German business system. 
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Hall and Soskice, for example, point to the high level of investment in company-
specific assets in coordinated market economies, which means that ‘firms and workers 
have common interests to defend’ (2001, p, 58), whilst Whitley argues that alliance 
forms of ownership have promoted risk sharing and mutual dependencies between all 
stakeholders, particularly between employers and employees (1999, p.40-41). Works 
communities in German manufacturing are based on technical expertise, which shapes 
both managers’ and employees’ identities and interests (ibid, p.102-105). Thus, 
despite the parent company’s use of its power resources in the form of a team of 
Finnish HQ managers sent to occupy key management posts in the German 
subsidiary, resistance was continuing from other sectors of the works community. As 
shown earlier, engineers in R & D were resisting the new standardised production 
model, whilst the works council and middle management succeeded in thwarting the 
full implementation of the company model by using the works council’s legal rights 
in the areas of wages, control procedures, shifts and working hours and work 
organisation. HQ management respondents were vociferous in their complaints about 
the ability of the works council to block and influence the implementation of 
particular elements of the company model, which had included the standardisation of 
80% of all business processes including job descriptions and recruitment practices as 
well as work processes. They resented the fact that they have to ‘constantly go 
running to the works council to seek their permission to change things’ but had been 
forced to acknowledge that there was no way round adherence to the extensive 
legislation on the role to be played by workforce representatives inside the company. 
Whitley argues that management in Germany traditionally recognises the importance 
of employees and the fact that their distinct rights and interests should be reflected in 
decision-making since they depend on their skills and commitment for company 
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performance so it is usually less important that these rights are enshrined in the Works 
Constitution Act (1999, p.70, 80-82). However, as we can see in this case study, 
where foreign owners ignore or seek to overturn these interdependencies, the 
legislation can provide a useful fallback position for management and employees.  
 
The Finnish management interviewed referred to the new company model as leading 
to ‘a hell of a lot of problems’ as employees saw the changes as ‘all bad’ and were 
resisting their implementation not only through their legal representative body, the 
works council, but also in their daily work practices by non-adherence to new 
procedures i.e. not inputting data into the new SAP system at all or not doing it 
properly so the information the MNC receives is not trustworthy. In HQ 
management’s view ‘it is normal for the works council to be obstructive’ and they 
could find no way round the obstructions:  
 
‘Yes, we wanted to make a lot of changes but in actual fact we’ve changed relatively 
little…. certain things planned for in the model could therefore not be introduced 
here…we have to look for new solutions.’ 
 
This case seems to demonstrate that the institutional embeddedness of subsidiaries in 
a highly integrated NBS gives local management and employees and their 
representative bodies greater bargaining power to resist the globalisation of local 
practices, where this is seen as detrimental to the competitive advantages of the 
subsidiary. Hall and Soskice argue that ‘deliberative institutions’ in coordinated 
market economies such as powerful employer associations and trade unions, extensive 
networks of cross shareholding and legal and regulative systems upholding 
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collaboration ‘can provide the actors. with strategic capacities they would not 
otherwise enjoy’ (2001, p.12). Compared to the British subsidiaries, which had 
mainly operational charter responsibilities, all three German subsidiaries in our 
sample played a strategic role in their MNCs. However, foreign owners may see 
certain characteristics of the German NBS are as more of an obstacle than an 
advantage. Thus, Tempel referred to the case of a British MNC in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical sector, which decided to circumvent Germany and invest in other 
countries because of the constraining nature of German industrial relations (Tempel, 
2002).  
 
Case 3b: Subsidiary embeddedness operating in a weakly integrated NBS  
 
Our research underlines, in contrast to the tight integration and interdependencies of 
the German business system, the high level of compartmentalization of British 
business units (Whitley, 1999, p.61). This is shown in a low level of commitment and 
cooperation between firms and between employers and employees and a high level of 
mobility of operations. Whitley points to a lack of integration and systematic 
coordination of activities in British firms (ibid, p.61), which, together with the 
absence of legal constraints on management’s use of the labour resource and the weak 
rights of employee representative bodies, means that it is relatively easy for MNCs to 
close down their British manufacturing operations and cherry pick the most profitable 
area of the subsidiaries, which, in the case of our subsidiaries, was the services side 
(Geppert et al. 2002). In the view of the HR Director of the American MNC in the 
UK, Britain ‘is probably the easiest country in Europe to do different kinds of things 
[i.e. laying off personnel, the authors]. We really didn't have many obstacles.’  
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The unilateral management approach to restructuring, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon 
management systems, together with the weak collective employee rights in the UK, 
facilitated a rapid restructuring process. Whitley points out that changing patterns of 
work organisation in the UK is easier than in Germany since they are ‘not as tightly 
integrated with national regulatory institutions’ (1999, p.115). There was little 
support from management within the UK NBS for a continuation of (badly 
performing) manufacturing operations in the UK and no examples of alliances 
between local management and employee representative bodies to resist closures. In 
the UK, the national and occupational socialisation of local management towards 
finance and service priorities and the weak legal position of the trade unions as well 
as an institutional framework, which promotes adversarial relations rather than 
cooperation and collaboration, as shown earlier, meant the formation of a joint 
alliance to resist the elimination of manufacturing, as we found in the German 
subsidiaries, was not an option. 
 
Recent research on corporate government by Armour et al. (2003) points to some 
evidence that the UK NBS may be moving away from a sole focus on shareholder 
value, which has worked to the detriment of employees as well as other groups, 
towards a consideration of wider stakeholder interests, which will favour the inclusion 
of employee voice in the restructuring process in the future. We found, however, little 
evidence of this during our fieldwork. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has developed three key aspects, which influence the ability of local 
management and employee representatives to make strategic choices and negotiate 
‘charter changes’. We found firstly that the overall strategic approach of the MNC 
influences strategic choice, power and policies of the local subsidiary. The more the 
strategic decision-making approach of the MNC is decentralised, the more strategic 
choice local subsidiaries have to develop idiosyncratic power resources and local 
practices. A more negotiated approach gives subsidiaries more room for bottom-up 
development of local strategies and policies, which can help to avoid conflicts and 
political struggle. The more the MNC applies a centralised strategic decision-making 
approach, the greater is the possibility that local choice and power resources will 
decrease. This can lead to conflict and political struggle between local subsidiaries to 
enhance or just to maintain their original charter responsibilities.  
 
In line with e.g. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) we showed, in addition, that a strong 
strategic position and good company performance of the subsidiary within the MNC 
can provide local managers with a greater bargaining power, even when the company 
seeks to use an imposed and centralised approach to develop increasing global 
standardization of local practices.  
 
As a key finding, we argue that the greater the degree of social embeddedness of the 
local subsidiary in a highly integrated business system, the more problematic the 
implementation of global practices and the more idiosyncratic local politics and 
power resources will be. The greater the social embeddedness of the local subsidiary 
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in a highly integrated business system, the greater is the power of local subsidiaries to 
influence the implementation of global management practices. However, if the local 
subsidiary is in a weakly integrated Anglo-Saxon type business system, the power 
resources and strategic choice to resist and influence the implementation of global 
practices are limited. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 illustrates these effects on the roles played by local management and 
employee representatives in the implementation of MNC strategies. Extensive 
involvement of local actors was found in the German plant of the German MNC, 
where local management and the works council played an active role in both the 
development and the delivery of a DQP response to new market pressures. The plant 
occupied a strong strategic position within the MNC with its close links to R & D and 
was a strong performer. It was, of course, embedded in the German NBS, which is 
supportive of DQP strategies. 
 
However, in the German MNC’s UK subsidiary, restricted involvement of local actors 
was found. The subsidiary did not occupy a strategic position within the MNC as a 
stand-alone manufacturing unit and was a poor performer compared to other 
subsidiaries in the group. The UK NBS is also not supportive of manufacturing 
companies so that it was easy to close down the UK manufacturing operations. 
However, due to the negotiated decentralized strategy of the parent, local British 
managers were able to develop their own ideas on the new customer services focus. 
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The contestation of MNC strategies was very marked in the German subsidiary of the 
Finnish MNC and HQ management have been forced to adopt a ‘German solution’ to 
the implementation of their global strategy. The important strategic role of the 
subsidiary, its strong economic performance and its embeddedness in a tightly 
integrated business system supportive of manufacturing and, in particular, of 
customised craft production gave local actors power resources they were able to 
deploy to enforce a more negotiated local solution. 
 
The passive acceptance of MNC strategy occurred in the British subsidiary of the 
Finnish MNC, where the subsidiary accepted the new company model and, despite 
misgivings, implemented it in the UK. However, although the UK NBS is not 
supportive of manufacturing, this subsidiary, alone among the British subsidiaries we 
investigated, continues to manufacture escalators. We explain this with reference to 
the fact that it continues to draw strength from its close links to its former German 
parent company, now the German subsidiary contesting the Finnish MNC model of 
global standardised production.  
 
In terms of the implications of different NBSs for HRM in both the MNC HQ and 
subsidiary level, the more highly integrated systems, such as the German NBS, appear 
to force MNCs to adapt their global strategies to the national context and this leads to 
greater securities for labour in terms of skills reproduction security, representational 
security and work security (Standing, 1997). In such systems there are clear limits to 
the commodification of labour and the use of unilateral and so-called ‘hard’ HRM 
practices by management. This is underscored by recent work by Gospel and 
Pendleton (2003), which contrasts the UK and German systems of capitalism, 
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particularly the influence of finance and governance systems, and their effect on the 
management of labour policies and practices. Their findings point to the continuing 
influence of diversified quality production on employment patterns, training and 
workforce development in Germany (p.566), the development of firm-specific human 
capital and the promotion of employee commitment via employee voice in the form of 
the works councils (p.567). The important labour management outcomes are security 
of jobs and internal labour markets with high levels of skill formation (p.568-569). 
German managers, they argue, are able to exercise greater levels of strategic choice 
about how the firm and employees are managed than in the UK, where the 
management imperative is to heed shareholder value (p.567). They are also forced by 
law to take into account employee interests as a key stakeholder in the firm and have 
also been able to take a long-term view and invest more heavily in R & D, training 
and HR development than in the US and the UK (p.565-566). This helps to explain 
the strategic importance of our German subsidiaries for their MNCs as global centres 
for R & D and also their superior performance to their equivalent UK manufacturing 
establishments. This illustrates the interlinkage between our three key influences on 
local actors’ power resources and the respective NBS. An anomaly is the Finnish 
MNC’s choice of Germany as a centre for the development of a standard global 
product, even one of high quality. Hall and Soskice point out that companies invest in 
Germany primarily for quality control, skill levels and incremental innovation 
capacities (2001, p.57). Whilst Whitley argues that there is a close interrelationship 
between work systems and employment strategies in firms so that firms would not 
normally pursue a Taylorist work organisation whilst seeking long term commitment 
from manual workers and investment in their skill development (1999, p39), 
something the German subsidiary was well aware of and it was resisting the 
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imposition of more Taylorist operating practices. An explanation for the mismatch 
found in the Finnish MNC’s German subsidiary could perhaps be explained by 
looking at the history of its acquisition in Germany, whereby the German company 
was bought to operate as the MNC’s R & D centre for escalator production, an area 
the parent had no expertise in. The German subsidiary will still be the R & D and 
manufacturing centre in the new global strategy but both German management and 
employees saw the new strategy as wholly negative since it will, in their view, 
undermine their national source of competitive advantage based on a technical 
community of high level engineering expertise. 
 
Finally, we want to come back to our three ‘pull’ questions, (the who, how and why 
pulls), underlining a socio-political framework of strategic decision making in MNCs. 
First of all, the reasons why and how certain key local actors, managers and workers’ 
representatives, have more (or less) leverage ‘to pull’ is heavily influenced by the 
actors’ strategic position within the multinational group. That fits well with earlier 
studies of power and politics in organisations, stressing that the ability to solve 
dependency problems and to control relevant resources of uncertainty increases the 
power and influence of certain actors and groups of actors (see e.g. Crozier, 1964; 
Pfeffer, 1994). Secondly, our paper emphasises the influence of national institutions 
on local power relations and politics in MNCs, on who does the pulling. We have 
seen that subsidiary managers and employees based in countries with well-established 
industrial relations and education systems, such as in Germany, are more likely to 
develop pro-active micro-political approaches of both negotiation and resistance. In 
contrast, British subsidiary management developed rather passive political 
approaches, not just because of their weaker strategic position within the MNC, but 
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also because they could not rely on the same level of solidaristic support from societal 
institutions as their German counterparts. With reference to Kostova and Zaheer’s 
(1999) argument that local managers need both internal legitimacy (in the MNC itself) 
and external legitimacy (in the local context), we would like to add that the power 
resources key local actors draw on in decision-making processes relating to ‘charter 
changes’ remain intertwined with certain (external) NBS characteristics, an aspect 
often neglected in North-American research about MNCs. That leads, thirdly, to the 
question of emerging transnational institutions and whether they provide socio-
political space for active negotiation of and resistance to globalization strategies in the 
implementation at local level. A proper answer to that question is of course going far 
beyond the scope of this paper, but recent research on emerging transnational 
institutions, such as European works councils (see e.g. Hancke, 2000), raises doubts 
about whether these new arrangements will support a more solidaristic organisation of 
local interests and the participation of a broad variety of local actors across national 
borders in strategic decision-making processes. Thus, the influence of NBS 
characteristics will continue to be important in understanding local responses to 
globalization strategies in MNCs. 
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American 
MNC  
 
 
Finnish 
MNC 
 
 
German 
MNC  
 
Globalization policy Centralistic and fairly 
strong, but long 
established 
Extreme centralistic 
and strong, 
integration policy 
following recent 
growth by acquisition 
Rather decentralized 
and weak 
Market strategy Cost leadership in the 
mass market, 
standardized 
products 
Technology 
leadership in the 
mass market 
Quality leader in the 
upper segment of 
customized and small 
batch production 
Total number of employees 
worldwide 
63,000 23,000 28,500 
No. of countries with overseas 
subsidiaries 
200 40 102 
Percentage of employees abroad 84 % 94 % 93 % 
Size of German subsidiary: 
 sales (in Million Euro) 
 employees 
 
 700 
 4000 
 
 243 
 1800 
 
 421 
 1822 
Size of UK subsidiary 
 Sales (in Million Euro) 
 Employees 
 
 144 
 2700 
 
 205 
 1295 
 
 120 
 800 
Sources: Annual Reports 2001 and interviews by the authors 
 
 
Table 1: The three case study companies 
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1-MNC Strategy 2-Strategic 
Position and 
Performance of 
Subsidiary 
3-Extent of 
Institutional 
Embeddedness 
Influence of Local 
Actors in Strategy 
Implementation 
Negotiated 
decentralized 
Strong Strong Extensive 
involvement 
Negotiated 
decentralized 
Weak Weak Restricted 
involvement 
Imposed 
centralized 
Strong Strong Contested strategy 
implementation 
Imposed 
centralized 
Medium-strong Weak Passive acceptance 
of strategy 
 
Table 2: Three key effects on local actors’ influence to shape the implementation 
of MNC strategies 
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